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Casenote

Herring v. United States: The Continued
Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule

At its inception, the exclusionary rule was relatively straightforward:
The use at trial of evidence obtained from a search or seizure that
violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment 1 rights was itself a violation
of the defendant's constitutional rights.2 But throughout the exclusionary rule's history, its source, scope, purpose, and applicability have all
seen changes, ultimately limiting the situations in which evidence
obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation would be suppressed.3
The key to the limitation of the exclusionary rule was the United States
Supreme Court's eventual conclusion that the use at trial of illegally
seized evidence does not always violate the Constitution.4 The court's
decision in Herring v. United States5 is the most recent in a long line of

1.

U.S. CONST. amend IV.

2. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
3. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). Despite the fact that evidence
is initially obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure, if it is discovered in the
alternative by means wholly independent of a constitutional violation, the evidence is
admissible. Id.
4. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
5. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
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cases in which the Court has limited the applicability of the exclusionary
rule through the "good faith exception."6 By extending a preexisting
exception to the exclusionary rule,7 Herring made the rule inapplicable
when a police officer makes an arrest with a mistaken but reasonable
belief that there is a valid warrant, despite the fact that the officer's
mistaken belief was caused by another officer's negligence.'
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 7, 2004, Bennie Herring drove to the Coffee County, Alabama,
sheriff's department to access his impounded truck. After Herring left,
Investigator Mark Anderson asked Sandy Pope, the warrant clerk, to
check the sheriff's department's database for any outstanding warrants
on Herring. Pope's search returned no active warrants. Anderson then
requested that Pope call the Dale County, Alabama sheriff's department
to find out if Herring had any outstanding warrants there. Pope called
Sharon Morgan, the Dale County warrant clerk, whose search of that
sheriff's department's database returned an active warrant on Herring.
Pope informed Anderson of the active warrant and then asked Morgan
to fax over a copy. Anderson and another deputy then arrested Herring
and discovered methamphetamine and a firearm while searching him
incident to the arrest.

While Anderson and the deputy searched

Herring, Morgan went to fax the warrant to Pope but could not find it.
The Dale County clerk's office informed Morgan that the warrant had
been recalled five months earlier. For some reason, the recall had not
been entered into the sheriff's department's computer database. Once
Morgan discovered the mistake, she informed Pope. However, Herring
had already been arrested, searched, and found with the illegal
contraband.9
Herring was indicted in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama. He moved to suppress the firearm and
methamphetamine as evidence on the ground that his initial arrest was
illegal due to the lack of either a warrant or probable cause, rendering
the subsequent search also invalid. The district court denied his motion,
ruling that because the arresting officers acted in a good faith belief that
there was an outstanding warrant, application of the exclusionary rule

6. See id. at 704.
7. In Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995), the Court held that if a police officer
mistakenly believes in good faith that there is an outstanding warrant when he performs
ma arrest and subsequent search, the evidence will not be suppressed if the officer's belief
is reasonable and is based on an error of a court employee. Id. at 15-16.
8. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704.
9. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009).
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would serve no deterrent purpose.1" The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that even though the
unconstitutional search was caused by police error, the conduct that
caused "the error was merely negligent and attenuated from the arrest,"
making any deterrent benefit of suppressing the evidence marginal or
nonexistent." Therefore, the good faith exception of United States v.
Leon 2 was held to be applicable." In a 5-4 decision, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. 14 The Court held that
even if an officer's reasonable belief of a warrant's existence was caused
by police conduct, the evidence will not be excluded unless (1) the
conduct is deliberate or reckless to the extent that exclusion can deter
such conduct, and (2) deterrence is worth the price paid by society."
Because the unconstitutional search in this case was the result of
another police employee's isolated negligence that was attenuated from
the actual search, the Court held that application of the exclusionary
rule was unwarranted.' 6
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. A History of the Exclusionary Rule: From a ConstitutionalRight
to the BalancingApproach
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 7 guarantees "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."" The
text of the Amendment is notably silent as to what constitutes an
unreasonable search or seizure. 9 The general rule is that a search or
seizure performed by an officer without a warrant is unreasonable; 0
however, the Court has recognized a significant number of exceptions to
the warrant requirement.2 Arrests, searches, and stops can therefore

10. Id. at 699.
11. Id.
12. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
13. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 702. The Court explained that the cost to society is allowing guilty and
perhaps dangerous defendants go free. Id. at 701.
16. Id. at 698.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment allows a warrantless arrest in public upon probable cause); Carroll v.
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be performed in some circumstances by police officers without a
warrant.22 Nevertheless, it is a violation of a citizen's Fourth Amendment rights if he is subjected to a search or seizure by a police officer
without a warrant or under circumstances that do not fall into one of the
established exceptions. 23 Because the text of the Fourth Amendment
is also silent with regard to a means of enforcing its guarantees,' the
Court has struggled with how to give our Fourth Amendment rights real
meaning.
As early as 1877 in Ex parte Jackson' and again in 1886 in Boyd v.
United States,2 6 the Court hinted that there might be a rule of evidentiary exclusion for Fourth Amendment violations.27 However, the Court
did not actually acknowledge and apply the exclusionary rule until

United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (holding that the Fourth Amendment allows a
warrantless search of a car if the officer has probable cause to believe the car contains
contraband).
22. Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer does not need a warrant to arrest
someone in a public place. Watson, 423 U.S. at 423-24. The police officer only needs
probable cause to believe that the person is committing, has committed, or is about to
commit a crime. Id. Once a police officer has made a legal arrest, he has the power to
perform a search incident to the arrest without obtaining a warrant. United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). Also, an officer may perform a "stop" merely upon a
showing of reasonable suspicion that the citizen is committing a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Furthermore, if the officer has reason to believe that the person he has
stopped is armed and dangerous, he may perform a "frisk" to search for weapons. Id. at
27.
23. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ("[Slearches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
(footnote omitted)).
24. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.
25. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
26. 116 U.S. 616 (1886), overruled by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
27. At issue in Ex parte Jackson was a statute that prohibited mailing letters
concerning lotteries or similar materials. See 96 U.S. at 736. The Court held that if a
person's papers were in a sealed letter in the mail, the letters could not be opened and
examined without a warrant. Id. at 735. The Court held that a regulation excluding
matter from the mail could only be enforced through the courts "upon competent evidence
of their violation obtained in other ways." Id. Implicit in that statement is that a
regulation cannot be enforced in court by evidence obtained through unlawful inspection
of letters. See id. The Court did not get a chance to actually rule on whether it would
exclude the evidence because there was nothing showing that the evidence had been
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 736-37. In Boyd the Court held
that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the forced introduction of a man's papers into
evidence at trial. 116 U.S. at 621-22. The actual unreasonable search and seizure, the
Court held, were merely aggravating circumstances. Id. at 622.
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1914.28 Writing for a unanimous majority in Weeks v. United States,29
Justice Day explained that because the evidence at issue was obtained
through an unconstitutional search, its use in a federal prosecution was
barred by the Fourth Amendment. ° In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Day reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects the public
from unreasonable searches and seizures by placing federal officials, as
well as federal courts, under limitations and restraints." To include
evidence obtained in unlawful searches and seizures, he concluded,
"would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open
defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution."32 Justice Day's
proclamation of the exclusionary rule in Weeks did, however, confine the
rule's applicability to evidence obtained in constitutional violations
committed by the federal government only.33 Justice Day explained
that the rule did not apply to state officials, such as police officers,
because the Fourth Amendment did not regulate their conduct. 34
In Wolf v. Colorado,35 the Court considered whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment36 imposed the exclusionary rule
upon the states. 37 Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion 3 acknowledged that the right to be secure against arbitrary police intrusion is
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and therefore, it is imposed on
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.3 9 However, that basic right
did not demand the exclusion of evidence solely because the evidence
would be excluded in federal court under the Fourth Amendment.40
Twelve years later, the Court decided Mapp v. Ohio,41 in which it

again addressed the exclusionary rule's applicability to state prosecutions.42 Only Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter remained on the

28. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
29. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
30. Id. at 398.
31. Id. at 391-92.
32. Id. at 394.
33. Id. at 398.
34. Id.
35. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
36. U.S. CONST. amend X1V, § 1.
37. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 25-26.
38. Joining Justice Frankfurter were Chief Justice Vinson, Justice Black, Justice Reed,
Justice Jackson, and Justice Burton.
39. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28.
40. Id. at 28.
41. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
42. Id. at 646.
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court from the Wolf majority. Writing for the majority,4 3 Justice Clark
concluded that because the Fourth Amendment had been declared
enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, it
was "enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as
[was] used against the Federal Government."' Therefore, after the
Mapp decision, the exclusionary rule became both required by the
Constitution and applied to state prosecutions.45
In 1974 the case of United States v. Calandra" presented the Court
with the issue of whether the exclusionary rule applied to evidence
presented in grand jury proceedings.47 With only Justice Brennan and
Justice Douglas remaining from the Mapp majority, the Court held that
it did not." In reaching that decision, Justice Powell emphasized in his
majority opinion 9 that the exclusionary rule was not a personal
constitutional right, as the Court had previously held in Mapp. ° He
explained that the exclusionary rule was instead "a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect" on police misconduct.5' He concluded that
application of the exclusionary rule is, therefore, only appropriate when
the deterrent effect is sufficient to justify the potential injury imposed
on society by excluding competent evidence.5" Justice Powell reasoned
that application of the exclusionary rule to evidence in a grand jury
proceeding would have, at best, a minimal deterrent effect on police
misconduct.53 Because that minimal deterrent effect could not justify
the high cost to society of impeding the function of the grand jury, the
Court created a categorical exception to applying the exclusionary rule
in grand jury proceedings.5 4
In his dissenting opinion in Calandra,Justice Brennan explained that
the majority's holding had depreciated the exclusionary rule's applicability, making it turn only on whether, in a particular type of proceeding,

43.

Joining Justice Clark's majority opinion in Mapp were Chief Justice Warren,

Justice Black, Justice Douglas, and Justice Brennan.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
See id.
414 U.S. 338 (1974).
Id. at 339.

48. Id. at 351.
49.

Joining Justice Powell in his majority opinion were Chief Justice Burger, Justice

Stewart, Justice White, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist.
50. Calandra,414 U.S. at 348.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 349-50.
53. Id. at 351-52.
54. See id.
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exclusion would further deter future police misconduct. 5 Justice
Brennan's dissent would prove to be somewhat prophetic, as the Court
applied this balancing approach time and again to create categorical
exceptions to the exclusionary rule. For example, the Court has applied
this balancing approach to hold that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable
in federal civil proceedings,56 civil deportation proceedings,5 7 parole
revocation hearings," and federal habeas corpus proceedings when the
defendant had the opportunity to raise it at state trial.59
B. The Modern BalancingApproach Applied to the Good Faith Acts
of Police Officers
In Illinois v. Gates,60 the Supreme Court asked the parties to address
the issue of whether the exclusionary rule should be modified so as to
not apply to evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search
was constitutional. 61 Although the parties briefed and argued the
issue, the Court decided not to address it because the issue had not been

55. Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976). The Court held that in federal
civil proceedings the exclusion of evidence unlawfully seized by a state officer was not
shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterrence such that it outweighs the societal costs
of exclusion. Id.
57. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). The Court held that the balance
between the cost to society of excluding the evidence and the benefits of deterrence weigh
against applying the exclusionary rule in civil deportation hearings. Id.
58. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998). The Court held that
application of the exclusionary rule to state parole hearings would provide only minimal
deterrence of unconstitutional searches "because application of the rule in the criminal trial
context already provides significant deterrence." Id. Furthermore, the cost to society of
excluding the evidence is particularly high because the parolee is already a convicted
criminal. Id. at 365. Therefore, the exclusionary rule's deterrence benefits do not outweigh
the costs. Id. at 367.
59. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976). The Court held that application of
the exclusionary rule on collateral review of a state court conviction would not have a
significant deterrent effect so long as the defendant had the opportunity to raise the claim
at trial and on direct appeal. Id. at 492-93. Therefore, the rule does not apply in this
context because the deterrent benefits of application do not outweigh the substantial
societal costs. Id. at 494-95.
60. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
61. Id. at 217. The court asked the parties to address
(w]hether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, should to any extent be modified, so as, for
example, not to require the exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief
that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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presented at the state level.62 The Court did, however, address a
narrower version of that issue the following year.
In United States v. Leon," the Court was asked to decide whether the
exclusionary rule should be modified so as to not apply to evidence
seized in reasonable reliance on a magistrate-issued search warrant that
is later held to be defective." Writing for the majority,6" Justice White
stated that the issue "must be resolved by weighing the costs and
benefits of preventing the use ... of inherently trustworthy tangible
evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant."6 Despite acknowledging that the Court had never before recognized any form of good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, Justice White concluded that the
balancing approach supported modifying the rule to include a good faith
exception to searches conducted pursuant to warrants.67
Justice White reasoned that when a search is carried out pursuant to
a warrant, a court's inquiry is into the magistrate's finding of probable
cause and not into the propriety of the police officer's conduct." With
regard to the magistrate's behavior in making that determination,
Justice White stated three reasons why the exclusionary rule should not
be applied to modify such behavior: (1) the exclusionary rule is not
designed to punish the errors of judges and magistrates but rather to
deter police misconduct; (2) there is no evidence to suggest that judges
and magistrates ignore the Fourth Amendment; and (3) the exclusionary
rule would have no deterrent effect on magistrates.69 Justice White
then stated that the officer relying in objective good faith on the warrant
also can not be deterred by application of the exclusionary rule.70 The
magistrate has the responsibility to decide whether police allegations
establish probable cause, and accordingly, the officer can do nothing
more in seeking to comply with the law than to rely on that determination.7 ' Because there is no police illegality, there is nothing to deter.72
Justice White concluded that any marginal "benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a

62. Id.
63. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
64. Id. at 900.
65. Joining Justice White were Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell,
Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor.
66. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07.
67. Id. at 913.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See id. at 914-15.
Id. at 916.
Id. at 920-21.
id.
Id. at 921.
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subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial
costs of exclusion.""3 However, Justice White clarified that the Court's
holding was not that anytime the police had a warrant, the exclusionary
rule was inapplicable. 4 The reliance on the warrant must be objectively reasonable, and in some circumstances, there would be no reasonable
ground for believing that a warrant was issued properly."
He explained that exclusion would still be appropriate, for example, if an
officer provided information in an affidavit that the officer knew or
should have known was false.7 ' Also, the officer cannot be said to have
reasonably relied on a warrant if it was completely lacking in any indicia
of probable cause or if it was facially deficient. 7
The Court next addressed the question in Illinois v. Krull78 of
whether it should recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute
authorizing a search, and the statute is later found to violate the Fourth
Amendment.7
Concluding that the exclusionary rule should be
modified to embody that exception, Justice Blackmun stated in his
majority opinion that the approach used in Leon was applicable to this
situation. 0 There could be no deterrent effect on the officer because he
was acting in objectively reasonable reliance on the statute.8 ' Unless
the statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer is not required to
question the legislature's judgment." The officer is required to enforce
statutes as written; therefore, exclusion of evidence gained as a result
of this enforcement cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of
Fourth Amendment violations.' Furthermore, Justice Blackmun held
that, like judges, legislators could not be expected to be affected by
exclusion because (1) the exclusionary rule was designed to deter police
misconduct, not that of legislators,' (2) there is no evidence to suggest
that legislators are prone to violating the Fourth Amendment in
enacting statutes, 85 and (3) there is nothing to suggest that the

73. Id. at 922.
74.

Id.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 922-23.
Id. at 923.
Id.
480 U.S. 340 (1987).
Id. at 342.
Id. at 349.
Id.
Id. at 349-50.
Id. at 350.
See id. at 350-51.
Id. at 351.
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exclusionary rule would have any deterrent effect on legislators.8
Justice Blackmun clarified that a law enforcement officer cannot claim
reasonable reliance on a statute if it is written in such a way that a
reasonable officer should have known that it was unconstitutional. 7
Finally, the Court had to determine in Arizona v. Evans' whether
the exclusionary rule should apply when an officer acts in reasonable
reliance on a police record that indicates the existence of an outstanding
warrant, and the warrant is later found to be erroneous due to the error
of a court employee.89 Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion and
applied the reasoning of Leon.' He explained that the exclusionary
rule would not sufficiently deter errors made by court employees because
(1) it was designed to deter police misconduct, (2) there is no evidence to
show that court employees are inclined to subvert the Fourth Amendment, and (3) there is no basis for believing that the exclusionary rule
would have any effect on court employees responsible for informing
police that a warrant has been quashed.9
Furthermore, Justice
Rehnquist stated that application of the rule could not be justified based
on the deterrent effect on the police officer because, as the Court held in
Leon, there could be no deterrent effect on an officer acting with
objective 92reasonableness in relying on a police record that showed a
warrant.

III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

In Herring v. United States,9' the Court had to determine whether
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, created in United
States v. Leon,' should be extended beyond the contours of the Arizona
v. Evans96 decision. 96 The precise issue the Court faced was whether
evidence should be excluded when an officer reasonably believes there
is an outstanding arrest warrant, and his misbelief is based on the
negligent bookkeeping error of another police employee. 97 In a 5-4

86.

Id. at 350-52.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 355.
514 U.S. 1 (1995).
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15-16.
129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
514 U.S. 1 (1995).
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.
Id. at 698.
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majority, the Court concluded that such evidence should not be
excluded.9"
A.

Chief Justice Roberts's Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority," Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that
determining whether the exclusionary rule is applicable "turns on the
culpability of the police and the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful
police conduct.""° Citing a footnote in Leon, Justice Roberts stated
that in making this determination, the Court must consider the actions
of all officers involved.'
He then explained that the officers in Coffee
County had done nothing wrong in relying on the communication from
a Dale County employee about the outstanding warrant and that the
Dale County warrant clerk who had failed to update the computer
database had acted neither recklessly nor deliberately, but negligently."°2 Justice Roberts emphasized that this was crucial to the Court's
03
holding that the error was not enough by itself to require exclusion.
Justice Roberts reiterated that the exclusionary rule is not mandated
by the Constitution; but instead, it was judicially created for the purpose
of safeguarding Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent
effect.'
Because the exclusionary rule is not a right guaranteed by
the Constitution, exclusion of evidence does not always follow a Fourth
Amendment violation. 10 5 Furthermore, the exclusionary rule is not
always applicable, even when it does have potential to deter police
misconduct."° Rather, the exclusionary rule is applicable only when
the benefits of its deterrent effect outweigh the costs.' 7 Justice
Roberts explained that the cost of applying the exclusionary rule is that
it often results in letting guilty and dangerous defendants go free, a
result that offends the basic concepts of our country's criminal justice
system.'08 Because the costs are so high, to justify application of the
exclusionary rule, the potential for a positive deterrent effect must also

98.

99.
Justice
100.
101.
102.

Id.

Joining Chief Justice Roberts in the majority were Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy,
Thomas, and Justice Alito.
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.
Id. at 699-700 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 n.24).
Id. at 700.

103. Id.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 699.
at 700.
(citing illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1987)).
at 701.
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be high. 1' 9 Despite the fact that the Court had never held that the
exclusionary rule could have no deterrent effect on negligent police
conduct, Justice Roberts concluded that any deterrent effect on this type
of negligent recordkeeping would be minimal. ° Justice Roberts
illustrated his point by analogizing to Franks v. Delaware,.. a case in
which the Court held that false statements in an affidavit supporting a
warrant do not render the warrant invalid if the false statements
amount to nothing more than negligence or innocent mistakes of
fact.11 By the same logic, negligent miscommunication leading to a
mistaken belief that a warrant is still outstanding cannot be said to be
sufficiently deliberate such that exclusion can meaningfully deter future
mistakes." 3
Justice Roberts also explained that the level of flagrancy in the
unconstitutional search must be assessed. 4 The extent to which the
exclusionary rule is justified by its deterrent effect depends on the level
of culpability of the police misconduct.1 5 Evidence should only be
excluded if the officer knew or reasonably should have known that the
search was a Fourth Amendment violation.1 Excluding evidence only
when it is obtained by flagrant or deliberate violations accomplishes the
deterrent goals of the exclusionary rule.1 7 Justice Roberts emphasized
that the cases in history that gave rise to the exclusionary rule all
involved searches that were examples of flagrant and intentional police
misconduct in violation of the Fourth Amendment. n 8 An unconstitutional search "that arises from nonrecurring and attenuated negligence
is thus far removed from the core concerns that led" to the adoption of
the exclusionary rule in the first place." 9
Justice Roberts concluded that for the exclusionary rule to apply, the
"police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is

109. See id.

110. Id. at 702.
111.

438 U.S. 154 (1978).

112. Id. at 171, cited in Herring,129 S. Ct. at 703.
113.

See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703.

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 701.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 702.

118. Id. (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v.

United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
119. Id.

2010]

HERRING V. UNITED STATES

675

worth the price paid by the justice system."12 ° The rule serves to deter
reckless, deliberate, or grossly negligent conduct as well as systemic or
recurring negligence."' A negligent recordkeeping error, regardless
of the fact that it was made by the police, is not sufficiently deliberate
to be deterred by the exclusionary rule; likewise, an unconstitutional
search carried out in reasonable reliance on a warrant that had been
previously recalled cannot be said to be sufficiently culpable to justify
exclusion. 2' To clarify, Justice Roberts explained that for the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule to apply in this situation, the
1 23
officer's reliance on the existence of the warrant must be reasonable.
This determination of what is reasonable depends on whether a
reasonably well-trained officer, in light of all the circumstances,
including the particular officer's knowledge and experience, would have
believed that the warrant was still outstanding."2 For example, an
officer's reliance cannot be said to be reasonable if it is shown that
125
systemic recordkeeping errors were the norm in a warrant system.
Accordingly, Justice Roberts emphasized that the holding of the Court
should not be taken to imply that recordkeeping errors themselves could
never justify exclusion.1 21 If the police are shown to have been reckless in maintaining the warrant system or deliberate in making false
entries, exclusion would
be justified if such misconduct caused a Fourth
127
Amendment violation.

B. Justice Ginsburg'sDissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg asserted in her dissent 28 that for courts to have
any power to discourage the type of police errors at issue in this case, 'it
must be through the application of the exclusionary rule.'"'129 She
argued that without deterring these types of errors, the most serious
impact would be on innocent persons wrongfully arrested because of

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 703.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 704.
126. Id. at 703.
127. Id.
128. Joining Justice Ginsburg in her dissent were Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and
Justice Breyer. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also
wrote a separate dissent to make the point that the Court should apply the good faith
exception when an error by police personnel, rather than by a third party, caused the
unconstitutional search. Id. at 711 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Evans, 514 U.S. at 23).
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faulty information carelessly maintained.3 0
According to Justice
Ginsburg, the majority underestimated both "the need for a forceful
exclusionary rule and the gravity of recordkeeping errors in law
enforcement."'
She stated that while the exclusionary rule's main
objective is clearly deterrence, it also has value by enabling the judiciary
to avoid the taint of the original lawlessness and by ensuring the public
that the government does not benefit from such lawlessness. 3 ' She
emphasized that the exclusionary rule is the only effective remedy to
redress Fourth Amendment violations."3
Justice Ginsburg next addressed the majority's reasoning that the
exclusionary rule could, at best, only have a marginal deterrent effect on
careless misconduct.' 34 She contended that the risk of exclusion of
evidence would encourage policymakers and system managers to monitor
the performance of their systems and the personnel employed to operate
them.'35 She argued that the record in the instant case reflected no
routine practice of verifying the accuracy of the database, which led to
the mistake at issue.'3 6 The sheriff's department was in a position to
remedy its system's shortcomings, but it had no incentive to do so
without application of the exclusionary rule.'37 Referencing the large
role that electronic databases play in contemporary criminal justice,
Justice Ginsburg argued that the risk of "[ilnaccuracies in expansive,
interconnected collections of electronic information raise grave concerns
for individual liberty."' 38 The deterrent effect that exclusion will have
on recordkeeping errors, therefore, is well worth the price paid by
society.'39 Finally, Justice Ginsburg stated that the majority's concession that this exception to the exclusionary rule would apply to
deliberate or reckless conduct provided little comfort. 40
Even if
deliberate or reckless conduct caused the error, she complained that the
majority gave no indication of how a defendant would make that
showing."'

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 710.
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IMPLICATIONS

The Court's decision in Herring v. United States 4 2 is a significant
break from the Court's prior holdings regarding the good faith exception,
most notably because in those cases the error was caused by a third
party other than police personnel. In United States v. Leon, 43 Illinois
v. Krull,'" and Arizona v. Evans,45 the Court recognized that the
exclusionary rule could not deter the acts of third parties specifically
because those parties were not police officers. 46 In Herring the Court
broke from that logic and held that police error also cannot be meaningfully deterred if the error was merely negligent and attenuated from the
search. 47
A.

HerringConfined to Its Facts
Confined to its facts, Herring merely extends the good faith exception
acknowledged in Evans to situations in which attenuated police
negligence caused the mistake. 4 ' However, as Justice Ginsburg's
dissent argues, the majority's holding takes away an incentive for law
enforcement agencies to closely monitor warrant databases. 49 One of
the fundamental disagreements between Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Ginsburg was whether the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on
negligent maintenance of these databases would justify its cost to
society. 5 ° Regardless of who is right, any deterrent effect exclusion
would have had on the failure to properly maintain warrant databases
is sacrificed by the majority's holding in Herring. One of the implications of Herring will therefore necessarily be that law enforcement
agencies have less incentive to properly maintain warrant databases.
The result in this case was that the inaccurate database led to the arrest
of a criminal; however, the most regrettable and serious impact of
inaccurate police databases is that they could not only lead to less
effective law enforcement, but also to the occasional arrest and search
of an innocent person.' 5 '

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
480 U.S. 340 (1987).
514 U.S. 1 (1995).
Evans, 514 U.S. at 14-15; Krull, 480 U.S. at 350-51; Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.
129 S. Ct. at 702.
Id. at 698.

149. See id. at 709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
150. See supra Section III.
151. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Justice Roberts explains in the majority opinion that in some
situations recordkeeping errors could give rise to application of the
exclusionary rule.152 If the recordkeeping errors are reckless, deliberate, or constitute recurring or systemic negligence, the exclusionary rule
would be applicable.153 Justice Roberts gave an example of the type
of deliberate conduct that would give rise to exclusion, explaining that
exclusion would be justified if officers knowingly make false entries "to
lay the groundwork for future false arrests."5 4 However, lower courts
are given no indication of what would constitute reckless conduct in
recordkeeping or recurring or systemic negligence. 5' The only guidance given by Herring is that in a situation such as this, when a police
department has no routine practice of checking its database for accuracy,
the conduct still does not give rise to recurring or systemic negligence. 56 The recurring or systemic negligence standard is, therefore,
decidedly high.'
Furthermore, Justice Roberts seemed to place the
burden on the defendant to establish the requisite culpability giving rise
to the recordkeeping error. 55 As Justice Ginsburg argues in her
dissent, the majority gives no indication as to how this burden is to be
met.'5 9 Entitling the defendant to discovery concerning the general
practices of recordkeeping in the particular police department seems
impractical."6 However, even if the defendant was entitled to examine
the police department database, what would he have to show to establish
that the conduct was part of a practice of recurring or systemic
negligence? Despite Justice Roberts's explanation that not all recordkeeping errors will be exempt from the exclusionary rule, that assurance
is not comforting due to the uncertainty of when a recordkeeping error
rises to a level of culpability that justifies exclusion.

152.

Id. at 703 (majority opinion).

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 702.
157. Craig M. Bradley, Red Herringor the Death of the Exclusionary Rule?, 45 TRIAL,
Apr. 2009, at 52, 53.
158. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703. Language used by Justice Roberts, such as "[i]f the
police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system" and 'liln a case
where systemic errors were demonstrated," seems to indicate that he is placing the burden
on the defendant to establish the requisite level of culpability for exclusion. Id. at 703-04.
159. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 710 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
160.

See id.
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B. A BroaderLook at the Holding in Herring
Moving away from the facts of Herring and looking at the holding
more generally, it is important to take note of Justice Roberts's
proposition that for the exclusionary rule to be applicable, "police
conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully
deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price
paid by the justice system."' At least one legal scholar has contended
that this broader proposition is nevertheless confined by Justice
Roberts's explanation that the situation the Court was presented with
was one of "merely negligen[ce] ...

attenuated from the arrest." 2

The suspicion is that this limiting language was placed into Justice
Roberts's majority opinion to induce Justice Kennedy's swing vote."e
If the holding of Herring only applies to isolated negligence attenuated
from the arrest, then criminal defendants can breathe a sigh of relief
because this exception will not apply in most searches. 1" In most
situations, the police error is caused by the officer performing the
search-such as an officer's own erroneous belief that he has probable
cause to conduct a car search; thus, despite the level of culpability
involved in the error, it is not attenuated negligence, and the exclusionary rule will still apply.66
However, there are situations in which a warrant is not involved, but
the error is still attenuated negligence. A broad reading of Herring
suggests that the exclusionary rule will be inapplicable in these
situations as well. An example of this would be a situation in which an
officer in County A gives an officer in neighboring County B false
information that there is probable cause to arrest a suspect in County
B. The officer in County B makes the arrest and then performs a search
incident to it. Will the exclusionary rule apply because there was never
any probable cause to make the arrest? If the false assertion of probable
cause is found to be based on the simple negligence of the first officer,
nothing in Herring suggests that the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule would not be extended to apply to this situation,
despite the lack of a warrant. The first officer's negligence is attenuated
from the arrest and search, and the second officer's reliance on
information from a fellow police officer is reasonable.

161. Id. at 702 (majority opinion).

162. Id. at 699; Bradley, supra note 157, at 53.
163.

Bradley, supra note 157, at 53.

164. Id.
165. Id.
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C. The Extension of Herring to Probable Cause and Reasonable
Suspicion Determinations
The most troubling aspect of Herring is the possibility that it could
one day be extended to apply to searches and seizures that are not based
on reasonable reliance on a warrant or attenuated negligence. The law
as it stands after Herringlimits the good faith exception to situations in
which there is reasonable reliance on a warrant." However, since as
early as 1975, the Court has been making broad assertions in dicta
about the necessity for a general good faith exception for reasonable
police conduct.'67 Therefore, if the Court is presented with a case in
which a police officer, for example, made an erroneous determination of
probable cause to arrest or of reasonable suspicion to stop (such that can
be said to have been a reasonable mistake), it is feasible the Court could
apply the good faith exception and allow admission of the evidence. In
this situation, a judge would ask whether a mistake in the determination of probable cause or of reasonable suspicion was one a reasonably
well-trained officer could have made." If the mistake was determined
to have been reasonable, the good faith exception would be triggered,
and the evidence would not be excluded.169 The Court has explained
that an articulation of precisely what reasonable suspicion and probable
cause are is not possible. 70 Rather, "[tihey are commonsense, nontech-

166.

See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.

167.

See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975).

In Peltier Justice

Rehnquist reasoned that
[ilf the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then
evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that
the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
Then in Leon Justice White explained that
the balancing approach that [had] evolved in various contexts-including criminal
trials-forcefully suggestfed] that the exclusionary rule be more generally modified

to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief
that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.
468 U.S. at 909 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
255 (1983) (White, J., concurring)).

168. See James P. Fleissner, Glide Path to An "InclusionaryRule". How Expansion of
the Good Faith Exception Threatens to Fundamentally Change the Exclusionary Rule, 48

MERCER L. REV. 1023, 1045 (1997).
169. See id.
170.

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996). Chief Justice Rehnquist

defined reasonable suspicion as "'a particularized and objective basis' for suspecting the
person stopped of criminal activity." Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417-18 (1981)). He also defined probable cause as "existing [when] the known facts and
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nical conceptions that deal with the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life."' 7 ' Police officers are offered minimal guidance by
these broad, theoretical definitions. As a result, it would not be very
difficult for a police officer to show in a suppression hearing that his
determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause, despite being
erroneous, was nevertheless reasonable.' 7 2
Applying the good faith exception in this manner would significantly
reduce the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule.'73 Courts may begin
deciding the issue of reasonableness first as a matter of judicial
economy-especially in close calls-thereby avoiding clear rulings on
Fourth Amendment issues.'74 That result would lead to a hindrance
of the development of Fourth Amendment law.'75 Furthermore,
regardless of whether courts decide the Fourth Amendment issue,
creating precedents that establish that evidence is admissible despite
being illegally obtained could create situations in which police officers
are trained to act within what the courts have said is a good faith error
in a probable cause determination.'76 Under this theory, police are not
taught the line between legal and illegal; rather, they are taught the line
between reasonably illegal and unreasonably illegal.'77
Whether striking the proper balance or not, to whatever extent the
exclusionary rule is limited, the judicial safeguard of our Fourth
Amendment rights is also limited. Leaving the protection of our Fourth
Amendment rights solely in the discretion of police officers, who are
concerned primarily with apprehending criminals and not with the
constitutional rights of the public, is for all practical purposes asking the
fox to guard the henhouse.
ROBERT W, SMITH

circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief." Id.
171. Id. at 695 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 231 (1983)).

172. See Fleissner, supra note 168, at 1045.
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1045-46.
176. Id. at 1046.
177. Id.

